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Considerations on Determination
of Good Moral Character*
JOHN

R.

STARRSt

Why did you rape her?
Well, the opportunity presented itself to me and
-from an interview before a Character
and Fitness Subcommittee in Detroit.

COMMITTEEMAN:
APPLICANT:

I took it.

O

be divided on the problem presented by the
case of the confessed rapist? Is it reasonable to say that "oldfashioned notions of sexual morality ought go by the board" and therefore the applicant should be approved? Or is it more sensible to conclude
that what the applicant did to the girl he might well do with his client's
money or reputation, and therefore the applicant ought be disapproved?
We have been searching for some basic information on the establishment of good moral character. We find precious little which is of any
practical use to either student applicants or Character and Fitness Committees. All the writers are insistent that good moral character must be
proved. They all presume two things: first, that since student applicants
are aware of their own characters in fact, there is no problem of communication (i.e., the student ought without difficulty be able to convince
the committee of the fact which appears to him so obvious, that he is of
good moral character), a presumption which we find violent, and,
second, that Character and Fitness Committees are possessed of tremendous intuition plus a large, unclouded crystal ball, a presumption
which we likewise find violent.
Accordingly, we have gone into the authorities a little bit, have collated what we have found and added some comments. We trust that this
attempt will indicate the necessity of further research on the problem,
UGHT A SUBCOMMITTEE

*This excerpt is reprinted with permission from 18 Det. U. L. J. 295 (1955).
tA.B., 1934, Univ. of Detroit; LL.B., 1938, Univ. of Detroit; Member, State Bar
of Michigan; Chairman, Bar Admissions Committee of the Detroit Bar Associa-

tion; Chairman, Subcommittee on Character and Fitness, Thirteenth Congressional
District, State Bar of Michigan.
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and that what follows will elicit comment
from those who disagree.
Section 601.52, Michigan Compiled
Laws 1948 (Stat. Ann. §27.72) provides,
in part:
Any person.., who has the general education prescribed... and who is of good
moral character, may be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor in all the
courts of record of this state ... [provided
that he is able to] ... produce the certificate
... of ... the board of examiners, that he

possesses sufficient learning in the law, good
moral character and ability to enable him
to practice properly ....
On November 27, 1953, the Supreme
Court amended State Bar Rule 8 to provide
that the Bar Commissioners should appoint
a State Committee on Character and Fitness, and added a new Rule 16, providing
for the duties of such Committee and for
the appointment of subcommittees in each
Congressional district, and specifying:
It shall be the duty of the several subcommittees under the supervision and direction of the State Committee, to investigate
the moral character and requisite qualifications (other than scholastic) of student
applicants for admission to the bar, . . . in
sufficient time so that ... report may be

m-ade to the board of law examiners within
the time limit set by such board. 1
To conform to this new State Bar Rule,
the Board of Law Examiners thereupon
amended its own rule 3 to read, in part:
(a) Applicants will be obliged to satisfy
the Board that they possess good moral character and the requisite qualifications for the
practice of the law.
(b) Each applicant ... shall present him-

self for personal interview [before the appropriate subcommittee on Character and
Fitness of the State Bar of Michigan]....
1 337 Mich. xxxix.

The burden of complying with these requirements and of proving good moral
character and fitness is on the applicant....
It will be noted that while the applicants are given the duty of proving to
the subcommittees that they possess good
moral character and "requisite qualifications (other than scholastic)," and the
subcommittees are charged with reporting,
in effect, whether the applicants have sustained the burden of proof, no criteria are
provided. It will not escape notice that
"requisite qualifications (other than scholastic)" is language not found in the
statute.
The statute and rules would seem to pose
more problems than they answer. Who is
a person of good moral character? What
standards ought a subcommittee use in
judging an applicant? Can the rule have a
wider scope than the statute? What are
"requisite qualifications (other than
scholastic)"? Is due process involved? What
ought an applicant be prepared to prove
to a subcommittee?

Who Is a Person of Good Moral
Character? What Standards Ought
a Subcomnittee Use in Judging an

Applicant?
Alexander Pope wrote:
The good must merit God's peculiar care;
But who, but God, can tell us
2
who they are?
2 ESSAY ON MAN, epis. iv. The Michigan Legislature knew the answer, a generation ago. Act
163, P.A. 1913, set up standards for admission
to the Bar. The usual provision -for good moral
character was included. Section 5 of the Act permitted "the production of a diploma authenticated by the proper officers and duly sealed by
the said University of Michigan, Detroit College
of Law or University of Detroit" to be used as
irrefutable evidence not only of legal learning,
but of the required good moral character.
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Unfortunately, neither applicants nor
subcommittees are gifted with the omniscience of the Almighty, and hence need
some human standard. The standard cannot vary, else an applicant, learning that
the subcommittee in his district took a dim
view of certain extra-legal activities, could,
by the expedient of changing his address
to a Congressional district whose subcommittee had different ideas, defeat the very
purpose of the statute and rules.
There is little solace to be found in the
reported decisions, although it is instructive
to consider cases arising under our naturalization laws, 3 which require good moral
character as a prerequisite to citizenship.
The problem has puzzled the federal
judiciary. Judge Charles Edward Wyzanski,
Jr., a U. S. District Judge in Massachusetts,
considered it some ten years ago. He wrote:
Ordinarily, if Congress leaves a case to
a judge to decide, it expects him to appraise
the facts by technical criteria. He has not
the freedom which a jury so often exercises
to disregard the letter of the law and apply
the sentiment of the community. But there
are exceptional cases in which the judge
enjoys a broader scope. By using in the
Nationality Act a phrase so popular as
"good moral character," Congress seems to
have invited the judges to concern themselves not only with the technicalities of the
criminal law, but also with the norms of
society and the way average men of good
will act, in short with what Eugen Ehrlich
in Fundamental Principles of the Sociology
of Law (translated by W. L. Moll, Harvard
University Press, 1936), p. 501, calls "the
ascertainment of the living law." Cf. note,
4
43 Harv. L. Rev. 117.

3 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (1952). The requirement of "good moral character" has been
in the law for many years.
4 Petition of R .......
56 Fed. Supp. 969, 971
(D.C., Mass., 1944). Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 493,

But if "the norms of society and the way
average men of good will act" is to be our
standard, where are we? What constitutes
"society"? Who is an "average man of good
will"? If a lynch mob, comprising all the
adult population of a town, and acting
unanimously, should kill its victim, would
the "norm" of that "society" be properly
applied to a member of the mob who later
5
applied for admission to the Bar? Or must
defines "the living law" as "the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been
posited in legal propositions." He goes on, at p.
502, to suggest: "The knowledge of the living law
has an independent value, and this consists in the
fact that it constitutes the foundation of the legal
order of human society." The author had previously noted, at p. 493, that the source of our
knowledge of "the living law" was "first, the
modern legal document; secondly, direct observation of life, of commerce, of custom and usages
and of all associations not only of those that the
law has recognized but also of those that it has
overlooked and passed by, indeed even of those
that it has disapproved." The writer of the cited
note in the Harvard Law Review speaks, at p.
121, of the "apocalyptic criteria of individual
judges."
5 This is not so fantastic as it may sound. There
was a disbarment case on similar facts. See Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882), which had to
do with a lawyer who joined a lynch mob in
Tampa, Florida, during the noon recess of the
U. S. District Court. The victim, not a negro,
but a Scandinavian sailor alleged to have insulted
Southern womanhood, was hanged from a tree
outside the courtroom window. Mr. Justice
Bradley, for the majority, affirmed the disbarment
ordered by the court below, quoting Lord Mansfield: "The question is whether, after the conduct
of this man, it is proper that he should continue
a member of a profession which should stand free
from all suspicion." Mr. Justice Field dissented
passionately, emphasizing that Wall was being
disbarred for allegedly having committed an indictable offense which was not connected with his
professional conduct, and for which he had not
been tried and convicted. Wall was never disbarred in the state courts of Florida, and lived to
become a state court judge, apparently well
thought of.
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"society" be Puritan? Or must "society" be
state-wide or national?

Olin E. Watts, Chairman of the Florida
Board of Law Examiners, suggests that "the
applicant's moral fitness must be of a
higher order than moral fitness as usually
'6
defined and used in common parlance."
But what does he mean? And even though
we might emotionally agree with Mr. Watts,
how can we apply his norm?.
Judge Learned Hand, who pondered the
problem for many years in naturalization
cases, has observed:
While we must not, indeed, substitute
our personal notions as the standard, it is
impossible to decide at all without some
estimate, necessarily based on conjecture,
7
as to what people generally feel.
A little later, he put it another way:
We must try to appraise the moral repugnance of the ordinary man to the conduct
in question; not what an ideal citizen would
feel. 8
6XXIIl THE BAR EXAMINER 99, 100 (July, 1954).
7U.S. ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F. 2d 920, 921
(2d Cir. 1929).
8U.S. ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F. 2d 429,

431 (2d Cir. 1940). Use of this ground once
brought about an interesting conflict in the same
court between Hand and Jerome Frank. Repouille v. U.S., 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947),
was an appeal from a lower court finding that
Repouille was of good moral character (and
hence entitled to citizenship, having fulfilled the
other prerequisites) despite the fact that, less
than five years prior to the filing of his petition,
he had killed his son, who was mentally and
physically defective. The specific problem before
the Court was whether euthanasia was a crime of
sufficient moral turpitude to debar the person
committing it from citizenship on the ground that
such person was not of good moral character.
Hand, for the majority (consisting of himself
and Judge Augustus N. Hand) found that
Repouille was not of good moral character, and
reversed the trial judge, saying that only a minority of our people would agree that euthanasia

Does this mean that good moral character is a mere matter of "feeling"? Does this

mean that the emotions rather than reason
must control? Is this what Holmes meant
when he said that many an honest and
was morally justifiable, and concluding:
Left at large as we are, without means of
verifying our conclusion, and without authority to substitute our individual beliefs,
the outcome must needs be tentative; and
not much is gained by discussion. Id. at 153.
Frank retorted:
But the courts are not utterly helpless; such
judicial impotence has its limits. Especially
when an issue importantly affecting a man's
life is involved, it seems to me that we need
not, and ought not, resort to our mere
unchecked surmises, remaining wholly (to
quote my colleagues' words) "without means
of verifying our conclusions." Because court
judgments are the most solemn kind of governmental acts-backed up as they are, if
necessary, by the armed force of the government-they should, I think, have a more
solid foundation. I see no good reason why
a man's rights should be jeopardized by
judges' needless lack of knowledge. id. at
154.
The Hands had suggested that "the generally
accepted moral conventions of the time" ought
govern. Frank replied that "where we lack the
means of determining present-day public reactions, we should remand [with instructions to
afford] the opportunity to bring to the judge's
attention reliable information on the subject,
which he may supplement in any appropriate
way." It would thus appear, as suggested by a
Note in 16 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
138, 139 (1948), that "[b]y either technique the
judge is ineligible to make the final decision."
The note-writer, after considering the problems
raised by the conflict between Frank and the
Hands, concludes:
In the last analysis, any dependence by the
judge on a standard outside himself in determining the question of good moral character
in naturalization cases is likely to be unwise
when not altogether futile.
Whether pantheism or subjectivism is suggested, quaere. "Modern men," says Walter Lippmann, "have a low capacity to believe in the
invisible, the intangible, and the imponderable."
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sensible judgment is not arbitrary but,
rather, expresses
an intuition of experience which outruns
analysis and sums up many unnamed and
tangled impressions - impressions which
may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth? 9
Holmes has also written that "words
express whatever meaning convention has
attached to them." 10 Learned Hand has
said, "It is one of the surest indexes of a
mature and developed jurisprudence not to
THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 113 (1955). In the same

volume he notes (pp. 104-5) that for more than
two thousand years European thought has been
acted upon by the idea that the rational faculties
of man can produce a common conception of

law and order which possesses a universal validity. He observes "[t]hat the idea is not mere moonshine and cobwebs is attested by history." The

judges of the Second Circuit would seem to be
living proof of the continuation of judicial abdication dating at least as far back as Roman times
(infra note 12) and of the validity of the remarks

of Solicitor-General James M. Beck, delivered
at the 1921 American Bar Association Convention in Cincinnati. Mr. Beck's general subject was
The Spirit of Lawlessness. He spoke of

the general revolt against the authority of
the past-a revolt that can be measured by
the change in the fundamental presumption

of men with respect to the value of human
experience.
He went on to say:

In all former ages, all that was in the past
was presumptively true, and the burden was
upon him who sought to change it. Today,
the human mind apparently regards the lessons of the past as presumptively false-and
the burden is upon him who seeks to invoke
them. 46 AMER. BAR Ass'N REPORTS 167,
172 (1921).
George Santayana was certainly right when
he remarked, in his THE LIFE OF REASON: "Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it."
9 C. B. & Q. Railway Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S.

make a fortress out of the dictionary.""
Edmond Cahn has suggested that ascertainment of good moral character calls for
judgment without benefit of rules. 12 Are all
of these people right? Can any of them be
right? What is "right"? Are there any rules?
Must we rely upon our "feelings"? If we
have standards and consult them, is such
consultation evidence of immaturity or lack
of development? Must we follow the agnosticism of Hand, who has laid it down that:
Nor is it possible to make use of general
principles, for almost every moral situation
is unique; and no one could be sure how far
the distinguishing features of each case
would be morally relevant to one person
and not to another. Theoretically, perhaps
we might take as the test whether those who
would approve the specific conduct would
outnumber those who would disapprove;
but it would be fantastically absurd to try
to apply it. So it seems to us that we are
confined to the best guess we can make of
how such a poll would result.1 3
11 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (2d
Cir. 1945).
12 51 COL. L. REV. 838, 850 (1951). The notion
that making a conclusion on the subject is unjudicial is hardly new. Cicero relates a tale (DE
OFFICIls, Book III, cap. xix) told him by his own
father to the effect that one Pinthia, described

as equiti Romano sane honesto (ought we trans-

late "of good moral character"?) laid a wager
that he could establish in court that he was a
good man. Fimbria, the judge, declined to rule,
saying that he would be forced either to rob a
reputable man of his good name (should he find
against Pinthia) or to make a judicial finding on
a matter which ought be established by the performance of countless duties and the possession
of praiseworthy qualities without number (cur
ea res innumerabilibusofficiis et laudibus conti-

neretur). Cicero's comment was that it was a
shame that philosophers should remain in doubt
on moral questions concerning which even peas-

585, 598 (1907).

ants were certain. (Haec non turpe est dubitare
philosophos, quae ne rustici quidem dubitent?)

10Trimble v. Seattle, 231 U.S. 683, 688 (1914).

13Johnson v. U.S., 186 F. 2d 588, 590 (2d
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Isn't all of this but a diversion? Isn't all
14
of this evidence of lack of real thought
rather than of scholarly thinking? When
people become dazzled by their own cleverness, and sycophants build legends about
them even during their lifetimes, has not
the children's tale of The Emperor's New
Clothes come alive? And isn't there real
danger that the confusion and obscurity of
thought promoted by the many years' vapid
outpourings, of which the foregoing constitute but a tiny sample, can be taken ad-

vantage of by undesirables who find only
too true the complaint of Bassanio that

Cir. 1951). What effect pre-poll propaganda
might have on the result is not considered.
Whether Judge Hand would, in theory, accept a
mental hospital as a voting unit, and permit the
inmates and the staff to ballot on the sanity of
the staff, and abide by the result, is not clear.
Two years prior to the Johnson case just cited,
in Schmidt v. U.S., 177 F. 2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.
1949), he suggested that:
Even though we could take a poll, it would
not be enough merely to count heads, without any appraisal of the voters. A majority
of the votes of those in prisons and brothels,
for instance, ought scarcely to outweigh the
votes of accredited churchgoers. Nor can we
see any reason to suppose that the opinion
of clergymen would be a more reliable estimate than our own. The situation is one in
which to proceed by any available method
would not be more likely to satisfy the impalpable standard, deliberately chosen, than
that we adopted in the foregoing cases: that
is, resort to our own conjecture, fallible as
we recognize it to be.... We do not believe
that discussion will make our conclusion
more persuasive....
It should not be forgotten that the author of
this opinion is the author of THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY and is held in extraordinarily high
esteem. In an article which was published in
The New York Times Magazine for February 6,
1955, entitled "A Plea for the Freedom of
Dissent," Judge Hand concludes that, since absolute truth is impossible to attain, it is irrational
to speak of principles when, deep down, we all
realize that our "principles" are nothing more
than "the best postulates so far attainable" and
not "eternal verities" at all. See, in this connection, also, the dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson, in

Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 237-8
(1951): "Can we accept 'the moral standards
that prevail in contemporary society' as a sufficiently definite standard for the purposes of
the [Immigration] Act?... How should we ascertain the moral sentiments of masses of persons on any better basis than a guess?" The
Justice goes on to comment on "what treacherous grounds we tread when we undertake to
translate ethical concepts into legal ones, case
by case" and then observes: "We usually end
up by condemning all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than that we
disapprove it. In fact, what better ground is
there? Uniformity and equal protection of the
law can come only from a statutory definition
of fairly stable and confined bounds." He concludes with a footnote: "The vice of leaving
statutes that inflict penalties so vague in definition that they throw the judge in each case
back upon his own notions is the unconscious
tendency to
Compound for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to.
-Butler, 1 HUDIBRAS (1772 ed.) 28."
14 In Hand's New York Times Magazine article, supra note 13, he describes "the intolerable labor of thought" as being "that most
distasteful of all our activities."

In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But, being season'd with a gracious voice,
15
Obscures the show of evil?

Human experience, within the pedigree
of our own law, has shown that the integrity
of character of members of the bar is a
matter of public concern. 16 The persistent
use of the adjective "good" in describing
the requisites for a lawyer's character evidences a continuity of thought on the prob-

15 MERCHANT

OF

VENICE,

Act 111, scene ii,

lines 75-77.
16"Every Bar in the world," says Herman
Cohen in 30 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 464 (1914),
"seems to derive its ultimate origin from Rome.
In this country [i. e., England] the chain is
Rome,.

Gaul,

France,

Normandy, England."

That we are related, legally, to England, needs
no authority for verification. Good moral char-
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acter has been a requisite for all members of
the bar in all countries, across the miles and
across the centuries. Were Clyde Pharr's project of translating all Roman law into modern
English complete [Princeton published his
THEODOSIAN CODE in 1952], we would be able
to indicate the Roman basis for the point more
easily. At present, the texts available have not
been properly collated, and secondary authority only is at hand. For post-Roman matters,
MONUMENTA

GERMANIAE

HISTORICA,

LEGES,

is

considered usually reliable, although certainly
secondary and at times tertiary. In it we find
mention of the profession of advocate as far
back as the first years of the ninth century,
under Charlemagne. And we read that "no one
ought be admitted therein but men mild, pacific,
fearing God and loving justice." Why should
we care, especially since we are discussing a
very practical and very modern problem? A
recent commentator has put it:
Medieval ideas of law have played an important part in the modern world. Much
of modern law rests on medieval rules.
Courts, always interested in tfie continuity
and self-consistency of law-and sometimes
hostile to the policies of legislative majorities-have constantly reinterpreted enacted
law to conform with the law of the past,
and at times have also called on natural
law to strengthen their decisions.
See I LEWIS, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 31
(1954). There is another good reason for caring
about this Carlovingian rule. Carlyle has pointed
out (1 MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST

238) that Charlemagne did not make laws by
his own authority, this being one great difference between the Roman Empire and the Holy
Roman Empire. Charlemagne required the consent and advice of his wise men, and, in some
more or less vague sense, of the whole nation.
This judgment, Carlyle tells us, appears to be
"almost universally accepted." The available
authority would seem to indicate that the normal method of promulgating new laws was to
send a copy of the proposal to the local officials
and have it read in the public assembly- to the
upper classes, who, if they agreed, would sign
and seal the document (doubtless as a pledge
of future obedience). Messengers would then
be sent to inquire of the common people concerning the proposed changes, and, after all
had agreed, their signatures or other authentication would be appended. This seems a little

difficult to believe, from all that we know of
"freedom" in ninth century France, but the text
is plain: "Ut populus interrogetur de capitulis
quae in lege noviter addita sunt; et postquam
omnes consenserint, subscriptiones et manufirmationes in ipsis capitulis faciant." See MONUMENTA GERMANIAE

HISTORICA,

LEGES,

sec. ii,

vol. i, no. 40. Cf. also the remark of Professor
Charles H. McIlwain, in 16 SPECULUM 275, that
"sometimes the present-day exhibitions of
this
ignorance [of the middle ages] become almost
grotesque." If, then, by common consent in the
ninth century, a lawyer should be "mild, pacific,
fearing God and loving justice" (the entire idea
of which could just as well be translated "of
good moral character"), might it not be reasonable to conclude that there was general recognition, 1150 years ago, that the public weal
demanded a Bar composed of men of probity?

Moving across the Channel, we find that in
England after the Conquest, most of the lawyers
were clerics. For all of the libels which have
been perpetrated on the clergy, the fact doubtless is that, by and large, clergymen were of
good moral character. It might normally be
presumed that a churchman would have rather
higher standards of personal morality than, say,
a serf, or, say, a tavernkeeper. It was not until
the appointment of the first permanent judges
to sit in Westminster, in 1179, that there came
to be any real need for lawyers as a class, for
it was in that year that the Third Lateran Council, by its Canon 12, forbade clerics to "act
as advocates in secular courts," with certain
exceptions. The ultimate effect of this, of course,
was to laicize the Bar. Three generations later,
in 1280, the Bar had sunk so low that the
City of London had to set up, for the protection of the public, certain intellectual standards.
And while we cannot be certain as to the cause
of this decline, and although we know that the
argument post hoc ergo propter hoc is falla-

cious, the fact is that the decline coincided with
the laity taking over bench and bar from the
clergy. Pollock and Maitland are rather definite
in their opinion, which is found in I HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 112:
English law was administered by the selfsame men who were "the judges ordinary"
of the church's courts, men who were
bound to be, at least in some measure,
learned in the canon law... Blackstone's
picture of a nation divided into two parties,

"the bishops and clergy" on the one side
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contending for their foreign jurisprudence,
"the nobility and the laity" on the other
side adhering "with equal pertinacity to the
old common law" is not a true one. [Bl.
Comm., i, 19] It is by "popish clergymen"
that our English common law is converted
from a rude mass of customs into an articulate system, and when the "popish
clergymen," yielding at length to the pope's
commands, no longer sit as the principal
justices of the King's Court, the golden
age of the common law is over.
For the text of the London Ordinance of 1280,

see LIBER

CUSTUMARUM,

F.205 b., p. 280 in the

Rolls Series edition (RERUM BRITANNICARUM
MEDII AEVI SCRIPTORES), published in 1860 by
Longmans in London. The basic complaint was
ignorance, but it is to be noted that the mayor
and the aldermen, who were to conduct the
equivalent of a bar examination, were assisted
by autres prodeshommes de la cite and that the
ordinance defined the duties of the "counter"
(read "pleader") so as to include the gist of
canons 6, 10, and 44 of the current Canons of
Professional Ethics. The ordinance not only provides that the Bar applicant must "reasonably
understand" his profession, but also requires that
he must know how "becomingly" (avenauntment
is the word used) to manage the business of a
client. It may reasonably be presumed that the
mayor and the aldermen would have been familiar with the technical learning required as a
minimum; would it be unreasonable to presume
further that the prodeshommes were forerunners
of our character and fitness committees? Is there
no moral overtone in avenauntment? And, although what prompted the ordinance was the sad
state of affairs attributable to the ignorance of
the Bar, there was included a definite attempt to
regulate conduct, with penalties of suspension
from practice. And in the MIRROR OF JUSTICES,
that thirteenth-century document of doubtful
parentage, we read at p. 88 that a person who had
been excommunicated could no longer serve as
an attorney. Here, certainly, is evidence that the
moral character of the Bar is seriously considered. But by the beginning of the fifteenth
century, things had gone bad again, and the Bar
was once more ignorant and unscrupulous.
Hence, in 1402, by statute, 4 HENRY IV, cap.
xviii, all licenses to practice law were cancelled,
and provision made for the readmission of persons "that be good and virtuous, and of good
fame." It is stipulated that "if any of the said

attorneys do die, or do cease [one might think
"retire," but the text reads: 'si aucun de ditz
attourneez devie ou cesse'], the justices for the
time being by their discretion shall make another in his place, which is a virtuous man and
learned." From this statute forward, even during
that period in our own history when reaction to
learning brought about the rule that anyone
could be a lawyer, the requirement of good moral
character as a condition precedent, has been
standard. The need for good moral character in
lawyers in today's society has seldom been better
expressed than by Harold Lasswell. At p. 27 of
his volume, ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
(1948) he lays it down that the modern lawyer
is
the one indispensable adviser of every responsible policy-maker of our society whether we speak of the head of a government department or agency, of the executive of a corporation or labor union, of the
secretary of a trade or other private association, or even of the humble independent
enterpriser or professional man. As such an
adviser the lawyer, when informing his
policy-maker of what he can or cannot
legally do, is in an unassailably strategic
position to influence, if not create, policy.
Lasswell continues: "for better or worse, our
decision-makers and our lawyers are bound together in a relation of dependence or of identity."
The books are full of cases concerning lawyers in
high places who influenced, if they did not create,
policy. The books also contain cases indicating
the fall of unscrupulous or traitorous or unprincipled lawyers who had been in policyaffecting positions. That it was a character
defect which made these lawyers unprincipled
or traitorous or unscrupulous is a truism, but one
which it is valuable to repeat in these days when
Chief Justices pontificate that there is nothing
more certain in modern society than the principle
that there are no absolutes (Dennis v. U.S., 341
U.S. 494, 508 [1951]). The effect of a "learned"
profession without integrity of character in its
members would be chaos. Now if public concern
has demanded that members of the Bar be persons with integrity of character, and such is the
law, we have added verification of the wisdom
of Dr. Samuel Johnson's remark (found in I
HILL, JOHNSONIAN MISCELLANIES 223 [1897]) that
"the law is the last result of human wisdom
acting upon human experience for the benefit
of the public."
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lem. We make bold to say that it evidences
a continuity of standard.
Who is a good man? Horace asked the
question some years before the birth of
Christ, and his answer may be of some help.
He decided that a good man was a lawabiding traditionalist. 17 It would be difficult
to find a law-abiding traditionalist who
would not satisfy an average or ordinary
person that he was "good." Does this mean
that the definition is a proper one? Not
necessarily. It probably would not satisfy
Mr. Watts of Florida. Could one be a lawabiding traditionalist and be evil, not of
good moral character? It is a little difficult
to see how. Is being a traditionalist essential to being a good man? Hardly. It seems
probable that all law-abiding traditionalists
would be good men, but it by no means
follows that all good men are law-abiding
traditionalists. It may follow that all good
men are law-abiding-at least to the point
where the maxim cessante ratione ipsa lex
cessat comes into operation, or the conditions described in the opening portions of
17 In Horace's

EPISTLES, Book I, epis. xvi, we
read: "Vir bonus est quis? Qui consulta patrum,
qui leges iuraque servat." We have used our own
oversimplified translation in the text, thus avoiding the problem of distinguishing between ius and

lex and of explaining consulta patrum, which is

usually translated "the decrees" or "the customs
of our forefathers." We disagree, because there
is a standard Latin phrase for such thought (mos
maiorum) and Horace didn't use it. It would

seem sounder to translate consulta patrum as
"decrees of the senate." This would make it
correspond, in a fashion, to modern case law,
and with ius the natural law and lex the statutory
enactments, we seem to have covered the field.
That the concept of legal good in Rome was not
considered high, cf. Seneca's remark to Lucilius
in 64 A.D. (epis. xxxiv, sec. iii): "Being good
according to law isn't much of a problem."
(Exiguum est ad legern bonum esse.)

the Declaration of Independence are in
effect-but here we get into problems of
semantics.' 8
But if we say that the good man must be a
law-abiding traditionalist, do we mean that
there must be a uniformity of mind? If so,
how much? Is that uniformity which comes
from adjustment of the individual to the
group in which he lives a prerequisite to
being good? Is it a prerequisite to being a
lawyer? If complete adjustment should be
reached, would we not be well on the road
to the Orwellian state so terrifyingly de,scribed in 1984? And if we cannot go so
far as "group-think," will not uniformity of
mind produce a single outlook, a one-party
state and its concomitant, the brutalityridden dictatorship the possibility of which
seems to trouble so many of our thoughtful
citizens? No, we can hardly push it that far.
Our entire society, however, is based upon
a set of generally-accepted norms, a group
of common ideals, a certain amount of
mutual trust. This does not mean that we
are all conformists, except in a very limited
18 We are accustomed to think of the signers of
the Declaration of Independence as patriots; the
British Government under George Ill had other
ideas, and unquestionably the signers were not
law-abiding, so far as the British were concerned.
Certainly, in a narrow sense, they were not
traditionalists. Yet who today will say that they
were not good men? And, for the matter of that,
who today will say that the law-abiding royalists
of the time were not good men also? And could
we consult the majority, as Hand has suggested,
where would we be? The British, it will be
remembered, had a large fifth column, raised
about 25,000 volunteers in the province of New
York alone, and at the end of hostilities there
were 60,000 persons in that province: 30,000
civilians and a like number of British troops, a
great number of the civilians being Americans
dedicated to the loyalist cause. Who says we can
settle these things by majority vote?
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sense. 19 Complete uniformity would produce stagnation, and progress, as Edgar
Ansel Mowrer has noted, "is the work of
20
the dissatisfied."
To conclude, then, we disagree with
Hand when he says that it is impossible to
make use of general principles, but concur
with him when he says that the standard
should be something other than "our personal notions." For all of his agnosticism,
Hand agrees that there must be a standard.
If there were no standard, or if the standard
were unknown or unknowable, the subcommittees could not act, for, with no
standards, their decisions would necessarily
be arbitrary. 21 Approval of any applicant
19 Our conformity to convention, for example,
keeps us to the right of the road, but keeps our
English friends to the left. No one on either side
of the Atlantic claims that motorists are sheep
because of this. We all agree that two and two
make four, and no one cries that the schools'
insistence upon this rather old-fashioned notion
smothers free thought or has deprived our children of their precious birthright of freedom of
speech or thought in the field of arithmetic. No
one argued with Holmes when he said that freedom of speech did not include the right to scream
"Fire!" in a crowded theatre. The "majority"
which prevails in elections is usually an actual
minority of the persons eligible to vote. Yet
losing candidates do not contest election results
on such a basis with a claim that it would be
"unfair" to put them out of office under the
circumstances. The motto attributed to everyone
from St. Augustine to Luther is apropos:
In essentiis unitas;
In dubiis Jibertas;
In omnibus caritas.
20XXXVIII THE SATURDAY REVIEW, No. 6, p.
40 (February 5, 1955).
21 This introduces a related problem: Is it proper
for a subcommittee to act without there being
any antecedent adoption by the Supreme Court
or the State Board of Law Examiners of specific
regulations or standards for governing what shall
constitute "good moral character"? There are
constitutional connotations in such a question.

would be just as arbitrary and capricious
as rejection of any. The performance of the
duty assigned to the subcommittees entails
judgments, involves decisions. We recognize that, since "good" is one of the primary ideas which defy precise definition,
any definition of any concept which itself
involves use of the word "good" will not
find everyone in accord therewith. We recognize also that the subcommittees on character and fitness are not engaged in a
philosophical seminar, but must confound
the theorists and make specific decisions
in concrete cases based upon the facts presented to them. As a practical matter, decisions cannot be made without guiding
principles any more than business can be
transacted without money. Even as the
money involved in a transaction need not
change hands in the form of coin, so the
principles involved in a decision need not
be specifically expressed: to deny the existence of money because it happened that
money in its primary form was not used
in a transaction would be as sensible as to
deny the existence of principles because, in
a given decision, they happened to be unexpressed. The subcommittees making the
decisions cannot, in Archibald MacLeish's
phrase, be refugees from consequences,
exiles from the responsibilities of moral
An exhaustive search by the editors of A.L.R.
uncovered but one case in point, Bell v. Regents,
295 N.Y. 101, 65 N.E. 2d 184, 163 A.L.R. 900
(1946). The case held that antecedent regulation
was unnecessary. Counsel for Bell included
Lloyd Paul Stryker. No petition for certiorari
was ever filed. It seems reasonable to presume,
therefore, that Stryker determined that even the
dissenting opinion (which was sprinkled with
such phrases as "doubtful constitutionality," "assignment or delegation of quasi-judicial power,"
"unfettered discretion," and the like) was
insufficient, in view of the lack of other authority,
to warrant attempting to take the case up.

APRIL,

1956

choice. 22 If the decisions of the subcom-

mittees are made arbitrarily and capriciously, they are rightly subject to criticism,
whether due process be involved or not. If
the decisions of the subcommittees are
based on principle, they are not subject to
valid criticism.
We submit that the general principles of
what has come to be known as JudaeoChristian morality, which embodies the
23
natural law as recognized by all men,
must be the general principles by which an
applicant must live if he is to be considered
of good moral character. 24 This is not a
foggy notion, except for those who would
want to make it a foggy notion. We understand more than we can express. Intuitive
cognition has not had the psychological
attention which it deserves.
Horace's "law-abiding traditionalist," although not completely satisfactory, is probably as close as we are going to be able to
come, in a notoriously imprecise tongue
abroad in a semantically-imperfect world,
22 That the subcommittees must indeed have been
intended to have been considered responsible for
the consequences of their decisions would appear
from the inclusion, in the affidavit of history, of
a general release by the applicant of the Committee "from all liabilities whatsoever." The MacLeish phrase comes from his slender volume
THE IRRESPONSIBLES.

23 That this is a truism and not mere wishful
thinking, see the volumes published by the University of Notre Dame Press, annually from
1949 through 1953, entitled NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS.

24 "It would indeed be a travesty," said the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York, in suspending an attorney from practice
for a year because he had a monetary interest in
a social club in which card games for money
stakes were played, "if the Court were powerless
to restrain rogues from parading as its officers
simply because they were clever enough to divorce their professional lives from their private

to reducing the concept of the man of good
moral character to a few words. Whatever
version of the Decalogue he chooses, the
man of good moral character will follow
the Ten Commandments and that law
which, in the words of St. Paul, is "graven
'25
upon the heart of man."
lives." In re Fischer, 231 App. Div. 193, 247
N.Y. Supp. 168 (1930).
25 Romans ii, 15. For those who would insist that
we have concluded with practically useless generalities, we can offer two comments, 2200 years
apart, and neither by a Christian. The first is by
Aristotle. In his NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book I,
iii, 4, he wrote:
It is the mark of an educated man to look
for precision in each class of things just so
far as the nature of the subject permits; it
is equally unreasonable to accept probable
conclusions from a mathematician and to
demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
The second is by Holmes. (That he did not
consider himself a Christian, see his own remarks, I HOLMES-LASKi LETTERS 654, II id. 824.)
On January 17, 1899, he delivered an address to
the New York State Bar Association. It was reprinted in 12 HARv. L. REV. 443 (1899) under
the title Law in Science and Science in Law. At

page 457 he says:
When he has discovered that a difference is a
difference of degree, that distinguished extremes have between them a penumbra in
which one gradually shades into the other,
a tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking where
you are going to draw the line, and an advocate of more experience will show the arbitrariness of the line proposed by putting
cases very near to it on one side or the other.
But the theory of the law is that such lines
exist, because the theory as to any possible
conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful.
As that difference has no gradation about it,
when applied to shades of conduct that are
very near each other it has an arbitrary look.
We like to disguise the arbitrariness, we like
to save ourselves the trouble of nice and
doubtful discrimination. In some regions of
conduct of a special sort we have to be informed of facts which we do not know
before we can draw our lines intelligently,
and so, as we get near the dividing point,
we call in the jury.

